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1. Introduction 
 1.1.  The Great Moderation and the Current Crisis 
 Over the past couple of decades, there has been an increasingly widely accepted view that monetary 
policy had dramatically improved.  In fact, some attribute this as the cause of the “Great Moderation” in 
the economy‟s dynamics, by which output volatility had decreased substantially since the mid 1980s.  On 
Wall Street, that widely believed view was called the “Greenspan Put.”  Even Lucas (2003), who has 
become a major authority on the business cycle through his path-breaking publications in that area (see, 
e.g., Lucas 1987), had concluded that economists should redirect their efforts towards long term fiscal 
policy aimed at increasing economic growth.  Since central banks were viewed as having become very 
successful at damping the business cycle, he concluded that possible welfare gains from further 
moderations in the business cycle were small. 
 It is not our intent to take a position on what the actual causes of that low volatility had been, to 
argue that the Great Moderation‟s causes are gone, or that the low volatility that preceded the current 
crisis will not return.  Rather our objective is to investigate whether changes in monetary aggregates were 
in line with intended monetary policy before and during the Great Moderation, and if there was a 
significant change in the latter period that would legitimate assertions regarding a lower risk of future 
recessions since the mid 1980s.  We provide years of empirical evidence that do not support the view that 
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monetary policy had significantly improved before or after the Great Moderation and, mostly important, 
around recessions. We also argue that this lack of support was not factored into the decisions of many 
decision makers, who had increased their leverage and risk-taking to levels now widely viewed as having 
been excessive.  This conclusion will be more extensively documented in Barnett (2011). 
 A popular media view about the recent crisis is that the firms and households that got into trouble 
are to blame.  According to much of the popular press and many politicians, the Wall Street professionals 
and bankers are to blame for having taken excessive, self-destructive risk out of “greed.”  But who are the 
Wall Street professionals who decided to increase their leverage to 35:1?  As is well known, they 
comprise a professional elite, including some of the country‟s most brilliant financial experts.  Is it 
reasonable to assume that such people made foolish, self-destructive decisions out of “greed”?  If so, how 
should we define “greed” in economic theory, so that we can test the hypothesis?  What about the 
mortgage lenders at the country‟s largest banks?  Were their decisions dominated by greed and self-
destructive behavior?  Economic theory is not well designed to explore such hypotheses, and if the 
hypotheses imply irrational behavior, how would we reconcile a model of irrational behavior with the 
decisions of some of the country‟s most highly qualified experts in finance?  Similarly how would one 
explain the fact that the Supervision and Regulation Division of the Federal Reserve Board‟s staff ignored 
the high risk loans being made by banks?  Were they simply not doing their job, or perhaps did they too 
believe that systemic risk had declined, so that increased risk-taking by banks was viewed to be prudent? 
 To find the cause of the crisis, it is necessary to look carefully at the data that produced the 
impression that the business cycle had been moderated permanently to a level supporting greater risk 
taking by investors and lenders.  To find the causes of the “Great Moderation,” central bank policy may 
be the wrong place to look.  The federal funds rate has been the instrument of policy in the U.S. for over a 
half century, and the Taylor rule, rather than being an innovation in policy design, is widely viewed as 
fitting historic Federal Reserve behavior for a half century.
1
  The Great Moderation in real business cycle 
                                                          
1Although some other countries have adopted inflation targeting, Federal Reserve‟s policy innovation in recent years, if any, has 
most commonly been characterized as New Keynesian with a Taylor rule.  The Greenspan Put has most commonly been 
characterized as an asymmetric interest rate policy more aggressive on the downside than the upside, but that was not without 
precedent.  
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volatility may have been produced by events unrelated to monetary policy, such as the growth of U. S. 
productivity, improved technology and communications permitting better planning of inventories and 
management, financial innovation, the rise of China as a holder of American debt and supplier of low 
priced goods, perhaps permitting an expansionary monetary policy that otherwise might have been 
inflationary, or even a decrease in the size and volatility of shocks, known as the “good luck” hypothesis. 
This paper provides an overview of some of the data problems that produced the misperceptions of 
superior monetary policy.  The focus of this paper is not on what did cause the Great Moderation, but 
rather on the possible causes of the misperception that there was a permanent reduction in systemic risk 
associated with improved monetary policy.  This paper documents the fact that the quality of Federal 
Reserve data in recent years has been poor, disconnected from reputable index number theory, and 
inconsistent with competent accounting principles.  It is postulated that these practices could have 
contributed to the misperceptions of a permanent decrease in systemic risk. 
 This paper‟s emphasis is on econometric results displayed in graphics.  In all of the illustrations in 
this paper, the source of the misperceptions is traced to data problems. We find, for example, that the 
largest discrepancies between microeconomic theory-based monetary aggregate (Divisia) and simple sum 
monetary aggregates occur during times of high uncertainty, such as around recessions or at the beginning 
or end of high interest rate phases.  In particular, the rate of growth of Divisia monetary aggregates 
decrease a lot more before recessions and increase substantially more during recessions and recoveries 
than simple sum aggregates. In addition, we find that the rate of growth rate of Divisia monetary 
aggregates were generally lower than the rate of growth of simple sum aggregates in the period that 
preceded the Great Moderation, and higher since the mid 1980s. For the recent years, this indicates, for 
example, that monetary policy could have been more contractionary than intended before recessions and 
more expansionary than intended during the most recent recovery after the 2001 recession. There is a 
strain of thought that maintains that the current U.S. financial crisis was prompted by excessive money 
creation fueling the bubbles.  The process started in early 2001, when money supply was increased 
substantially to minimize the economic recession that had started in March of that year. However, in 
contrast with previous recessions, money supply continued to be high for a few years after the recession‟s 
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end in November 2001. In fact, money supply was high until mid 2004, after which it started decreasing 
slowly. The argument is that the monetary expansion during this first period led to both speculation and 
leveraging, especially regarding lending practices in the housing sector.  This expansion is argued as 
having made it possible for marginal borrowers to obtain loans with lower collateral values.   
 On the other hand, the Federal Reserve started increasing the target value for the federal funds rate 
since June 2004. We find that the rate of growth of money supply as measured by Divisia monetary 
aggregate fell substantially more than the rate of growth of simple sum monetary aggregate. Thus, the 
official simple sum index could have veiled a much more contractionary policy by the Federal Reserve 
than intended, which also occurred prior to most recessions in the last 50 years. For the recent period, 
when money creation slowed, housing prices began to decline, leading many to own negative equity and 
inducing a wave of defaults and foreclosures. 
 We see no reason to believe that the Federal Reserve would have as a goal to create „excessive‟ 
money growth.  Had they known that the amount of money circulating in the economy was excessive and 
could generate an asset bubble, monetary policy would have been reverted long before it did. Conversely, 
we see no reason to believe that the Federal Reserve intended to have an excessive contractionary 
monetary policy before the crisis. We provide evidence indicating that data problems may have misled 
Federal Reserve policy to feed the bubbles with unintentionally excess liquidity and then to burst the 
bubbles with excessively contractionary policy.  In short, in every illustration that we provide, the motives 
of the decision makers, whether private or public, were good.  But the data were bad. 
 
1.2.  Overview 
 Barnett (1980) derived the aggregation-theoretic approach to monetary aggregation and advocated 
the use of the Divisia or Fisher Ideal index with user cost prices in aggregating over monetary services.  
Since then, Divisia monetary aggregates have been produced for many countries.
2
  But despite this vast 
                                                          
2
 For example, Divisia monetary aggregates have been produced for Britain (Batchelor (1989), Drake (1992), and Belongia and 
Chrystal (1991)), Japan (Ishida (1984)), the Netherlands (Fase (1985)), Canada (Cockerline and Murray (1981)), Australia (Hoa 
(1985)), and Switzerland (Yue and Fluri (1991)), among many others.  More recently, Barnett (2007) has extended the theory to 
multilateral aggregation over different countries with potentially different currencies, and Barnett and Shu (2005) have extended 
to the case of risky contemporaneous interest rates, as is particularly relevant when exchange rate risk is involved.  That research 
was particularly focused on the needs of the European Central Bank.   
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amount of research, most central banks continue officially to supply the simple-sum monetary aggregates, 
which have no connection with aggregation and index number theory.  In contrast, the International 
Monetary Fund (2008) has provided an excellent discussion of the merits of Divisia monetary 
aggregation, and the Bank of England publishes them officially.  The European Central Bank‟s staff uses 
them in informing the Council on a quarterly basis, and the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank provides them 
for the US.  The simple sum monetary aggregates have produced repeated inference errors, policy errors, 
and needless paradoxes leading up to the most recent misperceptions about the source of the Great 
Moderation.  In this paper, we provide an overview of that history in chronological order. 
 We conclude with a discussion of the most recent research in this area, which introduces state-space 
factor modeling into this literature.  We also display the most recent puzzle regarding Federal Reserve 
data on nonborrowed reserves and show that the recent behavior of that data contradicts the definition of 
nonborrowed reserves.  Far from resolving the earlier data problems, the Federal Reserve‟s most recent 
data may be the most puzzling that the Federal Reserve has ever published. 
 
1.3.  The History 
 There is a vast literature on the appropriateness of aggregating over monetary asset components 
using simple summation.  Linear aggregation can be based on Hicksian aggregation (Hicks 1946), but that 
theory only holds under the unreasonable assumption that the relative user-cost prices of the services of 
individual money assets do not change over time.  This condition implies that each asset is a perfect 
substitute for the others within the set of components.  Simple sum aggregation is an even more severe 
special case of that highly restrictive linear aggregation, since simple summation requires that the 
coefficients of the linear aggregator function all be the same.  This, in turn, implies that the constant user-
cost prices among monetary assets be exactly equal to each other.   Not only must the assets be perfect 
substitutes, but must be perfect one-for-one substitutes --- i.e., must be indistinguishable assets, with one 
unit of each asset being a perfect substitute for exactly one unit of each of the other assets.   
 In reality, financial assets provide different services, and each such asset yields its own particular 
rate of return.  As a result, the user costs, which measure foregone interest and thereby opportunity cost, 
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are not constant and are not equal across financial assets.  The relative user-cost prices of U.S. monetary 
assets fluctuate considerably.  For example, the interest rates paid on many monetary assets are not equal 
to the zero interest rate paid on currency.  These observations have motivated serious concerns about the 
reliability of the simple-sum aggregation method, which has been disreputable in the literature on index 
number theory and aggregation theory for over a century.  In addition, an increasing number of 
imperfectly substitutable short-term financial assets have emerged in recent decades.  Since monetary 
aggregates produced from simple summation do not accurately measure the quantities of monetary 
services chosen by optimizing agents, shifts in the series can be spurious and can produce erroneous 
appearance of instability of structural functions containing monetary services variables. 
 Microeconomic aggregation theory offers an appealing alternative approach to the measurement of 
money, compared to the atheoretical simple-sum method.  The quantity index under the aggregation-
theoretic approach extracts and measures the income effects of changes in relative prices and is invariant 
to substitution effects, which do not alter utility and thereby do not alter perceived services received.  The 
simple-sum index, on the other hand, does not distinguish between income and substitution effects and 
thereby confounds together substitution effects with actual monetary services received.  The aggregation-
theoretic monetary aggregator function, which correctly internalizes substitution effects, can be tracked 
accurately by the Divisia quantity index, constructed by using expenditure shares as the component 
growth-rate weights.  Barnett (1978,1980) derived the formula for the user-cost price of a monetary asset, 
needed in computation of the Divisia index‟s share weights, and thereby originated the Divisia monetary 
aggregates.  The growth rate weights resulting from this approach are different across assets, depending 
on all of the quantities and interest rates in each share, and those weights can be time-varying at each 
point in time.  For a detailed description of the theory underlying this construction, see Barnett (1982, 
1987).   
 The user-cost prices are foregone interest rates, with foregone interest measured as the difference 
between the rate of return on a pure investment, called the benchmark asset, and the own rate of return on 
the component asset.  It is important to understand that the direction in which an asset‟s growth-rate 
weight will change with an interest rate change is not predictable in advance.  Consider Cobb-Douglas 
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utility.  Its shares are independent of relative prices, and hence of the interest rates within the component 
user-cost prices.  For other utility functions, the direction of the change in shares with a price change, or 
equivalently with an interest rate change, depends upon whether the own price elasticity of demand 
exceeds or is less than -1.  In elementary microeconomic theory, this often overlooked phenomenon 
produces the famous “diamonds versus water paradox” and is the source of most of the 
misunderstandings of the Divisia monetary aggregates‟ weighting, as explained by Barnett (1983). 
 Several authors have studied the empirical properties of the Divisia index compared with the simple 
sum index.  The earliest comparisons are in Barnett (1982) and Barnett, Offenbacher, and Spindt (1984).  
Barnett and Serletis (2000) collect together and reprint seminal journal articles from this literature.
3
  
Barnett (1997) has documented the connection between the well-deserved decline in the policy-credibility 
of monetary aggregates and the defects that are peculiar to simple sum aggregation.  
 The most recent research in this area is Barnett, Chauvet, and Tierney (2009), who compare the 
different dynamics of simple-sum monetary aggregates and the Divisia indexes, not only over time, but 
also over the business cycle and across high and low inflation and interest rate phases.  Information about 
the state of monetary growth becomes particularly relevant for policymakers, when inflation enters a 
high-growth phase or the economy begins to weaken.  Factor models with regime switching have been 
widely used to represent business cycles (see e.g., Chauvet 1998, 2005, Chauvet and Piger 2008), but 
without relationship to aggregation theory.  Barnett, Chauvet, and Tierney‟s model differs from the 
literature as the focus is not only on the estimated common factor, but on the idiosyncratic terms that 
reflect the divergences between the simple sum and Divisia monetary aggregate in a manner relevant to 
aggregation theory. 
 
2. Monetary Aggregation Theory 
 2.1. Monetary Aggregation 
 Aggregation theory and index-number theory have been used to generate official governmental data 
                                                          
3
 More recent examples include Belongia (1996), Belongia and Ireland (2006), and Schunk (2001).  The comprehensive survey 
found in Barnett and Serletis (2000) has been updated to include more recent article reprints in Barnett and Chauvet (2010).  
Other overviews of published theoretical and empirical results in this literature are available in Barnett, Fisher, and Serletis 
(1992) and Serletis (2006). 
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since the 1920s.  For example, the Bureau of Economic Analysis uses the Fisher ideal index in producing 
the national accounts.  One exception still exists.  The monetary quantity aggregates and interest rate 
aggregates officially supplied by many central banks are not aggregation-theoretic index numbers, but 
rather are the simple unweighted sums of the component quantities and the quantity-weighted or 
arithmetic averages of interest rates.  The predictable consequence has been induced instability of money 
demand and supply functions and a series of „puzzles‟ in the resulting applied literature.  In contrast, the 
Divisia monetary aggregates, originated by Barnett (1980; 1987) are derived directly from economic 
index-number theory.   
 Data construction and measurement procedures imply the theory that can rationalize the 
aggregation procedure. The assumptions implicit in the data construction procedures must be consistent 
with the assumptions made in producing the models within which the data are nested.  Unless the theory 
is internally consistent, the data and its applications are incoherent.  Without that coherence between 
aggregator function structure and the econometric models within which the aggregates are embedded, 
stable structure can appear to be unstable.  This phenomenon has been called the „Barnett critique‟ by 
Chrystal and MacDonald (1994) and in a very important recent paper by Belongia and Ireland (2010). 
 
 2.2. Aggregation Theory versus Index Number Theory 
 The exact aggregates of microeconomic aggregation theory depend on unknown aggregator 
functions, which typically are utility, production, cost, or distance functions.  Such functions must first be 
econometrically estimated.  Hence the resulting exact quantity and price indexes become estimator and 
specification dependent.  This dependency is troublesome to governmental agencies, which therefore 
view aggregation theory as a research tool rather than a data construction procedure. 
 Statistical index-number theory, on the other hand, provides nonparametric indexes which are 
computable directly from quantity and price data, without estimation of unknown parameters.  Within the 
literature on aggregation theory, such index numbers depend jointly on prices and quantities in two 
periods, but not on unknown parameters.  In a sense, index number theory trades joint dependence on 2-
period prices and quantities for dependence on unknown parameters.  Examples of such statistical index 
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numbers are the Laspeyres, Paasche, Divisia, Fisher ideal, and Törnqvist indexes.   
 The formerly loose link between index number theory and aggregation theory was tightened, when 
Diewert (1976) defined the class of second-order „superlative‟ index numbers, which track any unknown 
aggregator function up to the second order.  Statistical index number theory became part of 
microeconomic theory, as economic aggregation theory had been for decades.  Statistical index numbers 
are judged by their non-parametric tracking ability to the aggregator functions of aggregation theory.   
 For decades, the link between statistical index-number theory and microeconomic aggregation 
theory was weaker for aggregating over monetary quantities than for aggregating over other goods and 
asset quantities.  Once monetary assets began yielding interest, monetary assets became imperfect 
substitutes for each other, and the „price‟ of monetary-asset services was no longer clearly defined.  That 
problem was solved by Barnett (1978; 1980) derivation of the formula for the user cost of demanded 
monetary services.
4
   
 
 2.3. The Economic Decision 
 Consider a decision problem over monetary assets.  The decision problem will be defined in the 
simplest manner that renders the relevant literature on economic aggregation immediately applicable.
5
  
Initially we shall assume perfect certainty.  
 Let m
t
  = (m1t, m2t, … , mnt) be the vector of real balances of monetary assets during period t, let rt 
be the vector of nominal holding-period yields for monetary assets during period t, and let Rt be the one 
period holding yield on the benchmark asset during period t.  The benchmark asset is defined to be a pure 
investment that provides no services other than its yield, Rt, so that the asset is held solely to accumulate 
wealth.  Thus, Rt is the maximum holding-period yield in the economy during period t. 
 Let yt be the real value of total budgeted expenditure on monetary services during period t.  Under 
                                                          
4
 Subsequently Barnett (1987) derived the formula for the user cost of supplied monetary services.  A regulatory wedge can exist 
between the demand and supply-side user costs, if non-payment of interest on required reserves imposes an implicit tax on banks.  
Another excellent source on the supply side is Hancock (1991), who correctly produced the implicit tax on banks formula. 
5 Our research in this paper is not dependent upon this simple decision problem, as shown by Barnett (1987), who proved that the 
same aggregator function and index number theory applies, regardless of whether the initial model has money in the utility 
function, or money in a production function, or neither, so long as there is intertemporal separability of structure and certain 
assumptions are satisfied for aggregation over economic agents.  The aggregator function is the derived function that has been 
shown in general equilibrium always to exist, if money has positive value in equilibrium, regardless of the motive for holding 
money. 
- 10 - 
 
conventional assumptions, the conversion between nominal and real expenditure on the monetary services 
of one or more assets is accomplished using the true cost of living index,  = (pt), on consumer 
goods, where the vector of consumer goods prices is pt.
6
  The optimal portfolio allocation decision is:  
 maximize u(mt)                    (1)
 subject to π
t
 mt = yt,  
where π
t
 = (π1t ,…,πnt) is the vector of monetary-asset real user costs, with 
 πit = 
1
t it
t
R r
R


.
7
                   (2) 
The function u is the decision maker‟s utility function, assumed to be monotonically increasing and 
strictly concave.
8
  
 Let 
*
mt  be derived by solving decision (1).  Under the assumption of linearly homogeneous utility, 
the exact monetary aggregate of economic theory is the utility level associated with holding the portfolio, 
and hence is the optimized value of the decision‟s objective function:  
 Mt = u(
*
mt ).                   (3) 
 
 2.4. The Divisia Index 
 
 Although equation (3) is exactly correct, it depends upon the unknown function, u.  Nevertheless, 
                                                          
6 The multilateral open economy extension is available in Barnett (2007). 
7 There is a long history regarding the “price of money.”  Keynes and the classics were divided about whether it was the inflation 
rate of “the rate of interest.”  The latter would be correct for noninterest bearing money in continuous time.  In that case, as can 
be seen from equation (2), the user cost becomes Rt.  More recently, Diewert (1974) acquired the formula relevant to discrete 
time for noninterest bearing money, Rt /(1 + Rt).  Perhaps the first to recognize the relevance of the opportunity cost, Rt – rt, for 
interest bearing money was Hutt (1963, p. 92, footnote), and he advocated what later become known as the CE index derived by 
Rotemberg, Poterba, and Driscoll (1995).    Friedman and Schwartz (1970, pp. 151-152) document many attempts by Friedman‟s 
students to determine the user cost formula and apply index number theory to monetary aggregation).  But that work preceded the 
user cost derivation by Barnett and the work of Diewert () on superlative index number theory.  Those attempts were not based 
on valid user cost formulas or modern index numbers.  The best known initial attempt to use aggregation theory for monetary 
aggregation was by Chetty (1969).  But he used an incorrect user cost formula, which unfortunately was adopted by many other 
economists in subsequent research in monetary aggregation.  Through analogous economic reasoning, Donovan (1978) acquired 
the correct real user cost formula, (2).  As a result of the confusion produced by the competing user cost formulas generated from 
economic reasoning, application to monetary aggregation was hindered until Barnett () formally derived the formula by the 
normal method of proof using the sequence of flow of funds identies in the relevant dynamic programming problem.  Regarding 
that formal method of proof, see Deaton and Muellbauer (1980).  Barnett‟s proof and his derivation within an internally 
consistent aggregation theoretic framework marked the beginning of the modern literature on monetary aggregation.    
8
 To be an admissible quantity aggregator function, the function u must be weakly separable within the consumer‟s complete 
utility function over all goods and services.  Producing a reliable test for weak separability is the subject of much intensive 
research, most recently by Barnett and Peretti (2009).  If yt were nominal, then the user cost formula would have to be nominal, 
acquired by multiplying equation (2) by the price index used to deflate nominal to real income.  Regarding the choice of deflator, 
see Feenstra (1986). 
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statistical index-number theory enables us to track Mt exactly without estimating the unknown function, u.  
In continuous time, the monetary aggregate, Mt = u(
*
mt ), can be tracked exactly by the Divisia index, 
which solves the differential equation 
 
*
i
log log
t itit
d M d m
s
dt dt
                 (4) 
for Mt, where  
 
*
 it itit
t
m
s
y
 
is the i‟th asset‟s share in expenditure on the total portfolio‟s service flow.9  The dual user cost price 
aggregate Πt = Π( t ), can be tracked exactly by the Divisia price index, which solves the differential 
equation 
 
i
log logt it
it
d d
s
dt dt
 
 .                 (5) 
The user cost dual satisfies Fisher‟s factor reversal in continuous time:  
 ΠtMt = π t
 mt.                   (6) 
 As a formula for aggregating over quantities of perishable consumer goods, that index was first 
proposed by François Divisia (1925), with market prices and quantities of those goods used in equation 
(4).  In continuous time, the Divisia index, under conventional neoclassical assumptions, is exact.  In 
discrete time, the Törnqvist approximation is:  
 
* *
i
log log (log log )  t t-1 it it i,t-1M M s m m ,              (7) 
where  
 ( ) it it i,t-1
1
2
s s s . 
In discrete time, we often call equation (7) simply the Divisia quantity index.
10
  After the quantity index is 
                                                          
9 In equation (4), it is understood that the result is in continuous time, so the time subscripts are a short hand for functions of time.  
We use t to be the time period in discrete time, but the instant of time in continuous time.   
10
 Diewert (1976) defines a „superlative index number‟ to be one that is exactly correct for a quadratic approximation to the 
aggregator function.  The discretization (7) to the Divisia index is in the superlative class, since it is exact for the quadratic 
translog specification to an aggregator function.  In practice, the resulting “monetary services index” often is computed as a 
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computed from (7), the user cost aggregate most commonly is computed directly from equation (6).  
 
 2.5. Risk Adjustment 
 Extension of index number theory to the case of risk was introduced by Barnett, Liu and Jensen 
(1997), who derived the extended theory from Euler equations rather than from the perfect-certainty first-
order conditions used in the earlier index number-theory literature.  Since that extension is based upon the 
consumption capital-asset-pricing model (CCAPM), the extension is subject to the „equity premium 
puzzle‟ of smaller-than-necessary adjustment for risk.  We believe that the under-correction produced by 
CCAPM results from its assumption of intertemporal blockwise strong separability of goods and services 
within preferences.  Barnett and Wu (2005) have extended Barnett, Liu, and Jensen‟s result to the case of 
risk aversion with intertemporally non-separable tastes.
11
   
 
 2.6.  Dual Space 
 User cost aggregates are duals to monetary quantity aggregates.  Either implies the other uniquely.  
In addition, user-cost aggregates imply the corresponding interest-rate aggregates uniquely.  The interest-
rate aggregate rt implied by the user-cost aggregate Πt is the solution for rt to the equation:  
 
1
t t
t
R r
R


 = Πt. 
 Accordingly, any monetary policy that operates through the opportunity cost of money (that is, 
interest rates) has a dual policy operating through the monetary quantity aggregate, and vice versa.  
Aggregation theory implies no preference for either of the two dual policy procedures or for any other 
approach to policy, so long as the policy does not violate principles of aggregation theory.  In their current 
state-space comparisons, Barnett, Chauvet, and Tierney model in quantity space rather than the user-cost-
price or interest-rate dual spaces.  Regarding policy in the dual space, see Barnett (1987) and Belongia 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Fisher ideal index, rather than as a Törnqvist index.  Diewert (1978) has shown that the two indexes approximate each other very 
well. 
11
 The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Divisia database, which we use in this paper, is not risk corrected.  In addition, it is not 
adjusted for differences in marginal taxation rates on different asset returns or for sweeps, and its clustering of components into 
groups was not based upon tests of weak separability, but rather on the Federal Reserve‟s official clustering.  The St. Louis 
Federal Reserve Bank is in the process of revising its MSI database, perhaps to incorporate some of those adjustments.  
Regarding sweep adjustment, see Jones, Dutkowsky, and Elger (2005).  At the present stage of this research, we felt it was best to 
use data available from the Federal Reserve for purposes of replicability and comparability with the official simple sum data.  As 
a result, we did not modify the St. Louis Federal Reserve‟s MSI database or the Federal Reserve Board‟s simple sum data in any 
ways.  This decision should not be interpreted to imply advocacy by us of the official choices. 
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and Ireland (2006).  
 
 2.7. Aggregation Error and Policy Slackness 
 Figure 1 displays the magnitude of the aggregation error and policy slackness produced by the use 
of the simple sum monetary aggregates.  Suppose there are two monetary assets over which the central 
bank aggregates.  The quantity of each of the two component assets is y1 and y2.  Suppose that the central 
bank reports, as data, that the value of the simple sum monetary aggregates is Mss.  The information 
content of that reported variable level is contained in the fact that the two components must be 
somewhere along the Figure 1 hyperplane, y1 + y2 = Mss, or more formally that the components are in the 
set A:  
 A = {(y1,y2): y1 + y2 = Mss}. 
But according to equation (3), the actual value of the service flow from those asset holdings is u(y1,y2).  
Consequently the information content of the information set A regarding the monetary service flow is that 
the service flow is in the set E:  
 E = {u(y1,y2):  (y1,y2)  A}. 
 Note that E is not a singleton.  To see the magnitude of the slackness in that information, observe 
from Figure 1 that if the utility level (service flow) is Mmin, then the indifference curve does touch the 
hyperplane, A, at its lower right corner.  Hence that indifference curve cannot rule out the Mss reported 
value of the simple sum monetary aggregate, although a lower level of utility is ruled out, since 
indifference curves at lower utility levels cannot touch the hyperplane, A.  
 Now consider the higher utility level of Mmax and its associated indifference curve in Figure 1.  
Observe that that indifference curve also does have a point in common with the hyperplane, A, at the 
tangency.  But higher levels of utility are ruled out, since their indifference curves cannot touch the 
hyperplane, A.  Hence the information about the monetary service flow, provided by the reported value of 
the simple sum aggregate, Mss, is the interval  
 E = [Mmin,Mmax].  
 The supply side aggregation is analogous, but the lines of constant supplied service flow for 
financial firms are production possibility surfaces, not indifference surfaces, as shown by Barnett (1987).   
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3. The History of Thought on Monetary Aggregation 
 The fields of aggregation and index number theory have a long history.  The first book to put 
together the properties of all of the available index numbers in a systematic manner was the famous Irving 
Fisher (1922).   He made it clear in that book that the simple sum and arithmetic average indexes are the 
worst known indexes.  On p. 29 of that book he wrote:  
 “The simple arithmetic average is put first merely because it naturally comes first to the reader‟s mind, being 
the most common form of average.  In fields other than index numbers it is often the best form of average to 
use.  But we shall see that the simple arithmetic average produces one of the very worst of index numbers, 
and if this book has no other effect than to lead to the total abandonment of the simple arithmetic type if index 
number, it will have served a useful purpose.”  
 
 On p. 361 Fisher wrote:  
 “The simple arithmetic should not be used under any circumstances, being always biased and usually 
freakish as well.  Nor should the simple aggregative ever be used; in fact this is even less reliable.”  
 
 
 The simple sum monetary aggregates published by the Federal Reserve are produced from the 
“simple aggregative” quantity index.12  Indeed data-producing agencies and data-producing newspapers 
switched to reputable index numbers, following the appearance of Fisher‟s book.  But there was one 
exception:  the world‟s central banks, which produced their monetary aggregates as simple sums.  While 
the implicit assumption of perfect substitutability in identical ratios might have made sense during the 
first half of the 20
th
 century, that assumption became unreasonable, as interest-bearing substitutes for 
currency were introduced by financial intermediaries, such as interest bearing checking and saving 
accounts.  
 Nevertheless, the nature of the problem was understood by Friedman and Schwartz (1970,  
                                                          
12 While Fisher‟s primary concern was price index numbers, any price index formula has an analogous quantity index number 
acquired by interchanging prices and quantities.  Since the formulas are intended to track an increasing, linearly homogeneous, 
concave aggregator function in either case, the properties of the formula are the same, whether used as a price or a quantity index 
number.   
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151-152), who wrote the following:  
 
“The [simple summation] procedure is a very special case of the more general approach.  In brief, the general 
approach consists of regarding each asset as a joint product having different degrees of „moneyness,‟ and 
defining the quantity of money as the weighted sum of the aggregated value of all assets…. We conjecture 
that this approach deserves and will get much more attention than it has so far received.”  
 
 
 More recently, subsequent to Barnett‟s derivation of the Divisia monetary aggregates, Lucas (2000, 
p. 270) wrote:  
 
“I share the widely held opinion that M1 is too narrow an aggregate for this period [the 1990s], and I think 
that the Divisia approach offers much the best prospects for resolving this difficulty.”  
 
4. The 1960s and 1970s  
 Having surveyed the theory and some of the relevant historical background, we now provide some 
key results.  We organize them chronologically, to make the evolution of views clear.  We first provide 
results for the 1960s and 1970s.  The formal econometric source of the graphical results in this section, 
along with further modeling and inference details, can be found in Barnett, Offenbacher, and Spindt 
(1984) and Barnett (1982).  
 Demand and supply of money functions were fundamental to macroeconomics and to central bank 
policy until the 1970s, when questions began to arise about the stability of those functions.  It was 
common for general equilibrium models to determine real values and relative prices, and for the demand 
and supply for money to determine the price level and thereby nominal values.  But it was believed that 
something went wrong in the 1970s.  In Figure 2, observe the behavior of the velocity of M3 and M3+ 
(later called L), which were the two broad aggregates often emphasized in that literature.  For the demand 
for money function to have the correct sign for its interest elasticity (better modeled as user-cost price 
elasticity), velocity should move in the same direction as nominal interest rates.   
 Figure 3 provides an interest rate during the same time period.  Note that while nominal interest 
rates were increasing during the growing inflation of that decade, the velocity of the simple sum monetary 
aggregates in Figure 2 were decreasing.  While the source of concern is evident, note that the problem did 
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not exist, when the data were produced from index number theory.   
 Much of the concern in the 1970s was focused on 1974, when it was believed that there was a sharp 
structural shift in money markets.  Figure 4 displays a source of that concern.  As is evident from this 
figure – which plots velocity against a bond rate, rather than against time –– there appears to be a 
dramatic shift downwards in that velocity function in 1974.  But observe that this result was acquired 
using simple sum M3.  Figure 5 displays the same cross plot of velocity against an interest rate, but with 
M3 computed as its Divisia index.  Observe that velocity no longer is constant, either before or after 
1974.  But there is no structural shift. 
 There were analogous concerns about the supply side of money markets.  The reason is evident 
from Figure 6, which plots the base multiplier against a bond rate‟s deviation from trend.  The base 
multiplier is the ratio of a monetary aggregate to the monetary base.  In this case, the monetary aggregate 
is again simple sum M3.  Observe the dramatic structural shift.  Prior to 1974, the function was a 
parabola.  After 1974 the function is an intersecting straight line.  But again this puzzle was produced by 
the simple-sum monetary aggregate.  In Figure 7, the same plot is provided, but with the monetary 
aggregate changed to Divisia M2.  The structural shift is gone. 
 The econometric methods of investigating these concerns at the time were commonly based on the 
use of the Goldfeld (1973) demand for money function, which was the standard specification used by the 
Federal Reserve System.  The equation was a linear regression of a monetary aggregate on national 
income, a regulated interest rate, and an unregulated interest rate.  It was widely believed that the function 
had become unstable in the 1970s.   
 Swamy and Tinsley (1980), at the Federal Reserve Board in Washington, DC, had produced a 
stochastic coefficients approach to estimating a linear equation.  The result was an estimated stochastic 
process for each coefficient.  The approach permitted testing the null hypothesis that all of the stochastic 
processes are constant.  Swamy estimated the processes for the model‟s three coefficients at the Federal 
Reserve Board with quarterly data from 1959:2 – 1980:4, and the econometric results were published by 
Barnett, Offenbacher, and Spindt (1984).  The realizations of the three coefficient processes are displayed 
in Figures 8, 9, and 10 below.  The solid line is the process‟s realization, when money is measured by 
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simple sum M2.  The dotted line is the realization, when the monetary aggregate is measured by the 
Divisia index.  The instability of the coefficient is very clear, when the monetary aggregate is simple sum; 
but the processes look like noise around a constant, when the monetary aggregate is Divisia.  The 
statistical test could not reject constancy (i.e., stability of the demand for money function), when Divisia 
was used.  But stability was rejected, when the monetary aggregate was simple sum.  
 
5. The Monetarist Experiment:  November 1979 – November 1982  
 Following the inflationary 1970s, Paul Volcker, as Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, decided 
to bring inflation under control by decreasing the rate of growth of the money supply, with the instrument 
of policy being changed from the federal funds rate to nonborrowed reserves.  The period, November 
1979 – November 1982, during which that policy was applied, was called the “Monetarist Experiment.”  
The policy succeeded in ending the escalating inflation of the 1970s, but was followed by an unintended 
recession.  The Federal Reserve had decided that the existence of widespread 3-year negotiated wage 
contracts precluded a sudden decrease in the money supply growth rate to the intended long run growth 
rate.  The decision was to decrease from the high double-digit growth rates to about 10% per year and 
then gradually decrease towards the intended long run growth rate to avoid inducing a recession.  
 Figure 11 and Table 1 reveal the cause of the unintended recession.  As is displayed in Figure 11 
for the M3 levels of aggregation, the rate of growth of the Divisia monetary aggregate was substantially 
less than the rate of growth of the official simple-sum-aggregate intermediate targets.  As Table 1 
summarizes, the simple sum aggregate growth rates were at the intended levels, but the Divisia growth 
rates were half as large, producing a negative shock of substantially greater magnitude than intended.  For 
computational details, see Barnett (1984).  A recession followed.  
 
6. End of the Monetarist Experiment:  1983 - 1984  
 Following the end of the Monetarist Experiment and the unintended recession that followed, Milton 
Friedman became very vocal with his prediction that there had just been a huge surge in the growth rate 
of the money supply, and that surge would work its way through the economy and produce a new 
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inflation.  He further predicted that there would subsequently be an overreaction by the Federal Reserve, 
plunging the economy back down into a recession.  He published this view repeatedly in the media in 
various magazines and newspapers, with the most visible being his Newsweek article, “A Case of Bad 
Good News,” which appeared on p. 84 on September 26, 1983.  We have excerpted some of the sentences 
from that Newsweek article below:  
 “The monetary explosion from July 1982 to July 1983 leaves no satisfactory way out of our present situation. 
The Fed‟s stepping on the brakes will appear to have no immediate effect. Rapid recovery will continue under 
the impetus of earlier monetary growth.  With its historical shortsightedness, the Fed will be tempted to step 
still harder on the brake – just as the failure of rapid monetary growth in late 1982 to generate immediate 
recovery led it to keep its collective foot on the accelerator much too long. The result is bound to be renewed 
stagflation – recession accompanied by rising inflation and high interest rates... The only real uncertainty is 
when the recession will begin.”  
 
 But on exactly the same day, September 26, 1983, William Barnett published a very different view 
in his article, “What Explosion?” on p. 196 of Forbes magazine.  The following is an excerpt of some of 
the sentences from that article:  
 “People have been panicking unnecessarily about money supply growth this year. The new bank money 
funds and the super NOW accounts have been sucking in money that was formerly held in other forms, and 
other types of asset shuffling also have occurred. But the Divisia aggregates are rising at a rate not much 
different from last year‟s... the „apparent explosion‟ can be viewed as a statistical blip.”  
 
 Milton Friedman would not have taken such a strong position without reason.  You can see the 
reason from Figure 12.  The percentage growth rates in that figure are divided by 10, so should be 
multiplied by 10 to acquire the actual growth rates. Notice the large spike in growth rate, which rises to 
near 30% per year.  But that solid line is produced from simple sum M2, which was greatly 
overweighting the sudden new availability of super-NOW accounts and money market deposit accounts.  
There was no spike in the Divisia monetary aggregate, represented by the dashed line.  
 If the huge surge in the money supply had happened, then inflation would surely have followed, 
unless money is extremely non-neutral even in the short run --- a view held by very few economists.  But 
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there was no inflationary surge and no subsequent recession.  
 
7. The Rise of Risk Adjustment Concerns:  1984 - 1993  
 The exact monetary quantity aggregator function,  mt = u(mt), can be tracked very accurately 
by the Divisia monetary aggregate, mt
d
, since its tracking ability is known under perfect certainty.  
However, when nominal interest rates are uncertain, the Divisia monetary aggregate's tracking 
ability is somewhat compromised.  That compromise is eliminated by using the extended Divisia 
monetary aggregate under risk derived by Barnett, Liu, and Jensen (1997).  Let mt
G
 denote the 
extended “generalized” Divisia monetary aggregate.  The only difference between mt
G
 and mt
d
 is 
the risk-adjusted user cost formula used to compute the prices in the generalized Divisia index 
formula.  
 Let it
G
 denote the generalized user cost of monetary asset i.  Under CCAPM (consumptions 
capital asset pricing) assumptions, Barnett, Liu, and Jensen (1997) prove that  
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Barnett, Liu, and Jensen (1997) show that the values of φit determine the risk premia in interest 
rates.  Note that it
G
 reduces to equation (2) under perfect certainty.  
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 Using that extension, Barnett and Xu (1998) demonstrated that velocity will change, if the 
variance of an interest rate stochastic process changes.  Hence the variation in the variance of an 
interest rate ARCH or GARCH stochastic process cannot be ignored in modelling monetary 
velocity.  By calibrating a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model, Barnett and Xu (1998) 
showed that the usual computation of the velocity function will be unstable, when interest rates 
exhibit stochastic volatility.  But when the CCAPM adjusted variables above are used, so that the 
variation in variance is not ignored, velocity is stabilized.  
 Figure 13 displays the simulated slope coefficient for the velocity function, treated as a 
function of the exact interest rate aggregate, but without risk adjustment.  All functions in the 
model are stable, by construction.   Series 1 was produced with the least stochastic volatility in the 
interest rate stochastic process, series 2 with greater variation in variance, and series 3 with even 
more stochastic volatility.  Note that the velocity function slope appears to be increasingly 
unstable, as stochastic volatility increases.  By the model‟s construction, the slope of the velocity 
function is constant, if the CCAPM risk adjustment is used.  In addition, with real economic data, 
Barnett and Xu (1998) showed that the evidence of velocity instability is partially explained by 
overlooking the variation in the variance of interest rates over time.  
 Subsequently Barnett and Wu (2005) found that the explanatory power of the risk adjustment 
increases, if the assumption of intertemporal separability of the intertemporal utility function, T, is 
weakened.  The reason is the same as a source of the well known equity premium puzzle, by which 
CCAPM under intertemporal separability under-corrects for risk.  
 The Divisia index tracks the aggregator function, which measures service flow.  But for 
some purposes, the economic capital stock, computed from the discounted expected future 
service flow, is relevant, especially when investigating wealth effects of policy.  The economic 
stock of money (ESM), as defined by Barnett (2000) under perfect foresight, follows 
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immediately from the manner in which monetary assets are found to enter the derived wealth 
constraint, (2.3).  As a result, the formula for the economic stock of money under perfect 
foresight is 
 
1 1
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where the true cost of living index on consumer goods is  = (ps), with the vector of 
consumer goods prices being ps, and where the discount rate for period s is 
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The CCAPM extension of the economic capital stock formula to risk is available from Barnett, 
Chae, and Keating (2006).  
 During the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was increasing concern about substitution of 
monetary assets within the monetary aggregates (especially money market mutual funds) with 
stock and bond mutual funds, which are not within the monetary aggregates.  The Federal 
Reserve Board staff considered the possibility of incorporating stock and bond mutual funds into 
the monetary aggregates.  Barnett and Zhou (1994a) used the formulas above to investigate the 
problem.  They produced the figures that we reproduce below as Figures 14 and 15.  The dotted 
line is the simple sum monetary aggregate, which Barnett (2000) proved is equal to the sum of 
economic capital stock of money, Vt, and the discounted expected investment return from the 
components.  
 Computation of Vt requires modeling expectations.  In that early paper, Barnett and Zhou 
(1994a) used martingale expectations rather than the more recent approach of Barnett, Chae, and 
Keating, using VAR forecasting.  When martingale expectations are used, the index is called CE.  
Since the economic capital stock of money, Vt, is what is relevant to macroeconomic theory, we 
should concentrate on the solid lines in those figures.  Note that Figure 15 displays nearly 
- 22 - 
 
parallel time paths, so that the growth rate is about the same in either.  That figure is for M2+, 
which was the Federal Reserve Board staff‟s proposed extended aggregate, adding stock and 
bond mutual funds to M2.  But note that in Figure 14, the gap between the two graphs is 
decreasing, producing a slower rate of growth for the simple sum aggregate than for the 
economic stock of money.  
 The gap between the two lines is the amount motivated by investment yield.  Clearly those gaps had 
been growing.  But it is precisely that gap which does not measure monetary services.  By adding the 
value of stock and bond mutual funds into Figure 14 to get Figure 15, the growth rate error of the simple 
sum aggregate is offset by adding in an increasing amount of assets providing nonmonetary services.   
Rather than trying to stabilize the error gap by adding in more and more nonmonetary services, 
the correct solution would be to remove the entire error gap by using the solid line in Figure 14, 
which measures the actual economic capital stock of money.  
 
8. The Y2K Computer Bug:  1999-2000  
 The next major concern about monetary aggregates and monetary policy arose at the end of 
1999.  In particular, the financial press became highly critical of the Federal Reserve for what 
was perceived by those commentators to be a large, inflationary surge in the monetary base.  The 
reason is clear from Figure 16.  But in fact there was no valid reason for concern, since the cause 
was again a problem with the data.  
 The monetary base is the sum of currency plus bank reserves.  Currency is dollar for dollar 
pure money, while reserves back deposits in an amount that is a multiple of the reserves.  Hence 
as a measure of monetary services, the monetary base is severely defective, even though it is a 
correct measure of “outside money.”  At the end of 1999, there was the so-called Y2K computer 
bug, which was expected to cause temporary problems with computers throughout the world, 
including at banks.  Consequently many depositors withdrew funds from their checking accounts 
and moved them into cash.  While the decrease in deposits thereby produced an equal increase in 
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currency demand, the decrease in deposits produced a smaller decline in reserves, because of the 
multiplier from reserves to deposits.  The result was a surge in the monetary base, even though 
the cause was a temporary dollar-for-dollar transfer of funds from demand deposits to cash, 
having little effect on economic liquidity.  Once the computer bug was resolved, people put the 
withdrawn cash back into deposits, as is seen from Figure 17.  
 
9. The Supply Side  
 While much of the concern in this literature has been about the demand for money, there is 
a parallel literature about the supply of money by financial intermediaries.  Regarding the 
aggregation theoretic approach, see Barnett and Hahm (1994) and Barnett and Zhou (1994b).  It 
should be observed that the demand-side Divisia monetary aggregate, measuring perceived 
service flows received by financial asset holders, can be slightly different from the supply-side 
Divisia monetary aggregate, measuring service flows produced by financial intermediaries.  The 
reason is the regulatory wedge resulting from non-interest-bearing required reserves.  That 
wedge produces a difference between demand side and supply-side user-cost prices and thereby 
can produce a small difference between the demand side and supply side Divisia aggregates.  
 When there are no required reserves and hence no regulatory wedge, the general 
equilibrium looks like Figure 18, with the usual separating hyperplane determining the user cost 
prices, which are the same on both sides of the market.  The production possibility surface 
between deposit types 1 and 2 is for a financial intermediary, while the indifference curve is for a 
depositor allocating funds over the two asset types.  In equilibrium, the quantity of asset i 
demanded, mit, is equal to the quantity supplied, μit, and the slope of the separating hyperplane 
determines the relative user costs on the demand side, πit, which are equal to those on the supply 
side, γit.  
 That diagram assumes that the same user-cost prices are seen on both sides of the market.  
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But when noninterest-bearing required reserves exist, the foregone investment return to banks is 
an implicit tax on banks and produces a regulatory wedge between the demand and supply side.  
It was shown by Barnett (1987) that under those circumstances, the user cost of supplied 
financial services by banks is not equal to the demand price, (2), but rather is 
 γit =
(1 )
1
it t it
t
k R r
R
 

, 
where kit is the required reserve ratio for account type i, rit again is the interest rate paid on 
deposit type i, and now the bank‟s benchmark rate, Rt, is its loan rate.  Note that this supply-side 
user cost is equal to the demand-side formula, (2), when kit = 0, if the depositor‟s benchmark rate 
is equal to the bank‟s loan rate, as in classical macroeconomics, in which there is one pure 
investment rate of return.
13
  
 The resulting general equilibrium diagram, with the regulatory wedge, is displayed in Figure 
19.  Notice that one tangency determines the supply-side prices, while the other tangency produces 
the demand-side prices, with the angle between the two straight lines being the “regulatory 
wedge.”  Observe that the demand equals the supply for each of the two component assets.  
 Although the component demands and supplies are equal to each other, the failure of 
tangency between the production possibility curve and the indifference curve can result in a wedge 
between the growth rates of aggregate demand and supply services, as reflected in the fact that the 
user cost prices in the Divisia index are not the same in the demand and the supply side aggregates.  
To determine whether this wedge might provide a reason to compute and track the Divisia 
monetary supply aggregate as well as the more common demand-side Divisia monetary aggregate, 
Barnett, Hinich, and Weber (1986) conducted a detailed spectral analysis in the frequency domain.  
 Figure 20 displays the squared coherence between the demand and supply side Divisia 
                                                          
13 An excellent source on the supply side is Hancock (1985a,1985b,1991), who independently acquired many of the same results 
described in this section, but using a different procedure for determining inputs and outputs in production.  Our view is that the 
distinction should be based upon value added in production, rather than upon the ex-post realization of the user cost price. 
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monetary aggregates, where coherence measures correlation as a function of frequency.  The figure 
provides those plots at three levels of aggregation.  Note that the correlation usually exceeds 95% 
for all three levels of aggregation at all frequencies, but the coherence begins to decline at very 
high frequencies (i.e., very short cycle periods in months).  Hence the difference between the 
demand and supply side monetary aggregates is relevant only in modelling very short run 
phenomena.  
 To put this into context, we displays plots in the time domain for simple-sum M3, the supply-
side M3 Divisia index (SDM3), and the demand-side M3 Divisia index (DDM3) over the same 
time period used in producing the frequency domain comparisons.  See Figure 21 for those plots.  
Notice that it takes over a decade for the difference between the demand side and supply side 
Divisia index to get wider than a pencil point, but the divergence between simple sum and either of 
the two Divisia aggregates begins immediately and is cumulative.  In short, the error in using the 
simple-sum monetary aggregates is overwhelmingly greater than the usually entirely negligible 
difference between the demand and supply side Divisia monetary aggregates.  Furthermore, in 
recent years reserve requirements have been low and largely offset by sweeps.  In addition, the 
Federal Reserve recently began paying interest on required reserves, although not necessarily at 
bank‟s full loan rate.  The difference between the demand and supply side Divisia monetary 
aggregates now is much smaller than during the time period displayed in Figures 20 and 21.  
 
10. The Great Moderation 
 The most recent research on the comparison of microeconomic aggregated-based Divisia 
and the simple sum monetary aggregates is Barnett, Chauvet, and Tierney (2009).  The paper 
proposes a latent factor Markov switching approach that separates out common dynamics in 
monetary aggregates from their idiosyncratic movements.  The dynamic factor measures the 
common cyclical movements underlying the monetary aggregate indices.  The idiosyncratic term 
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captures movements peculiar to each index.  The approach is used to provide pairwise 
comparisons of Divisia versus simple-sum monetary aggregates quarterly from 1960:2 to 2005:4.  
In that paper, they introduced the connection between the state-space time-series approach to 
assessing measurement error and the aggregation theoretic concept, with emphasis upon the 
relevancy to monetary aggregation and monetary policy.  
 
 10.1.  The Model 
 Let Yt be the n x 1 vector of monetary indexes, where n is the number of monetary indexes 
in the model:  
 Yt = Ft +t+vt,                       (8) 
where = 1 – L and L is the lag operator.  Changes in the monetary aggregates, Yt, are 
modeled as a function of a scalar unobservable factor that summarizes their commonalities, Ft; 
an idiosyncratic component n x 1 vector, which captures the movements peculiar to each index, 
vt;  and a scalar potential time trend t.  The factor loadings, , measure the sensitivity of the 
series to the dynamic factor, Ft.  Both the dynamic factor and the idiosyncratic terms follow 
autoregressive processes:  
 Ft =
tS
α  + (L)Ft-1t   t ~N(0, 
2σ ),                (9) 
 vt = h
tS
Γ +d(L)vt-1+t,         t ~ i.i.d. N(0,      (10)
where t is the common shock to the latent dynamic factor, and t are the measurement errors.  In 
order to capture potential nonlinearities across different monetary regimes, the intercept of the 
monetary factor switches regimes according to a Markov variable, St, where 
tS
α 0 + 1

tS , 
and tS  = 0, 1. That is, monetary indexes can either be in an expansionary regime, where the 
mean growth rate of money is positive ( tS  = 1), or in a contractionary phase with a lower or 
negative mean growth rate ( tS  = 0).  
 We also assume that the idiosyncratic terms for each index follow distinct two-state 
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Markov processes, by allowing their drift terms, h
tS
Γ , to switch between regimes.  For example, 
in the case of two monetary indexes, n = 2, there will be two idiosyncratic terms, each one 
following an independent Markov process tS  and 

tS , where 

tS  = 0, 1 and 

tS = 0, 1.  Notice 
that we do not constraint the Markov variables tS , 

tS , and 

tS to be dependent of each other, 
but allow them instead to move according to their own dynamics. In fact, there is no reason to 
expect that the idiosyncratic terms would move in a similar manner to each other or to the 
dynamic factor, since by construction they represent movements peculiar to each index not 
captured by the common factor.  
 The switches from one state to another is determined by the transition probabilities of the first-order 
two-state Markov processes, kijp  = P(
k
tS =j|
k
tS 1 = i), where  1,0 1
1
0
,i,j,p
j
k
ij    with k =  
identifying the Markov processes for the dynamic factor and the two idiosyncratic terms, respectively.  
 The model separates out the common signal underlying the monetary aggregates from 
individual variations in each of the indexes. The dynamic factor captures simultaneous 
downturns and upturns in money growth indexes.  On the other hand, if only one of the variables 
declines, e.g. M1, this would not characterize a general monetary contraction in the model and 
would be captured by the M1 idiosyncratic term.  A general monetary contraction (expansion) 
will occur when all n variables decrease (increase) at about the same time.  That is, t  and vt are 
assumed to be mutually independent at all leads and lags for all n variables, and d(L) is diagonal.  
The dynamic factor is the outcome of averaging out the discrete states.  Although the n monetary 
indexes represent different measurements of money, the estimated dynamic factor is a nonlinear 
combination of them, representing broader movements in monetary aggregates in the U.S.  On 
the other hand, once a contraction or expansion is clearly under way, the idiosyncratic term for a 
particular aggregate can be highly informative near a turning point.  
 Dynamic factor models with regime switching have been widely used to represent business 
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cycles. The proposed model differs from the literature in its complexity, as it includes estimation 
of the parameters of three independent Markov processes.  
 The model is cast in state space form, where (11) and (12) are the measurement and 
transition equations, respectively:  
 Yt = Z t + Gt              (11)
 t = 
st
μ + T t-1 + ut.            (12) 
A particular state space representation for the estimated indicator using two variables is:  
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The term Ft-1 is included in the state vector to allow estimation of the dynamic factor in levels 
from the identity Ft-1 = Ft-1 - Ft-2.  
 Barnett, Chauvet and Tierney (2009) estimate three models, one for each pair of the rate of 
growth of monetary indexes: simple sum M1 and Divisia M1, simple sum M2 and Divisia M2, 
and simple sum M3 and Divisia M3, where Divisia corresponds to the “monetary services index” 
(MSI) computed from the Divisia index by the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank.  
 
10.2.  Results 
 There are some remarkable short run differences between simple sum and Divisia monetary 
aggregates, as shown in Barnett, Chauvet, and Tierney (2009). Figure 22 displays the 
idiosyncratic terms specific to the growth rates of Divisia M3 and simple sum M3, and NBER-
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dated recessions.
14
  Recall that the idiosyncratic terms indicate in which ways the two aggregates 
differ.  
 First, the idiosyncratic term for M3 is generally higher than the one for Divisia M3 before 
1984, especially in the 1970s. However, after 1984 this pattern reverts, and M3 is generally 
lower than Divisia M3. This is also the case for the difference between the indices Divisia M3 
and simple sum M3, also shown in Figure 22. That is, before 1984 the more precise measure of 
the growth rate of money supply (Divisia M3) was smaller than what was perceived (as 
measured by the official simple sum M3).  On the other hand, during the Great Moderation the 
rate of growth of money supply as measured by Divisia was higher than perceived, as measured 
by simple sum. That is, monetary policy was more contractionary before 1984 and more 
expansive during the Great Moderation than shown by simple sum. This result, at the least, calls 
for a re-examination of the extensive literature that investigates tightness of monetary policy 
before and after 1984.  
 Second, the idiosyncratic terms differ substantially around recessions. Compare Divisia 
M3‟s idiosyncratic downward spikes in Figure 22 with simple sum M3‟s idiosyncratic behavior 
and then compare the relative predictive ability of the two extracted idiosyncratic terms with 
respect to NBER recessions. The Divisia M3 decreases a lot more before recessions (at the peak 
of inflation phases) and increase substantially more during recessions and recoveries 
(corresponding to low interest rate phases) than the simple sum aggregate M3, respectively. 
 This is also observed in the difference between the two indices as depicted in Figure 22. 
Accordingly, the Divisia index displays a business cycle pattern more consistent with monetary 
policy. However, notice as well as that more contractionary policy before recessions than 
                                                          
14 This pattern is also observed between the simple sum M2 and Divisia M2 monetary aggregate. In particular, the major 
divergences between simple sum M3 and Divisia M3 growth coincide in time and amplitude with the differences between simple 
sum M2 and Divisia M2 growth. We will report here the results for M3. Details on the results for M1 and M2 can be found in 
Barnett, Chauvet, Tierney (2009). 
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intended could have contributed for the onset of these phases of weak economic activity.  
 The most notable differences between Divisia M3 and simple sum M3 take place between 
1978 and 1982, a period that includes the changes in the Fed operation procedures, a slowdown, 
and two recessions.  As discussed in section 5, the Divisia index was substantially lower than 
simple sum M3, especially right before the 1980 and 1981 recessions. The only recession that 
was not preceded by a fall in the Divisia index was the 1990-1991 (the Divisia index decreased 
in 1989 but had a subsequent increase before the onset of this recession). Thus, with the 
exception of the 1990 recession, monetary policy has been more contractionary before recessions 
than intended. This is the case before or during the Great Moderation.  
 Figure 23 plots the idiosyncratic terms for Divisia and simple sum, but now against high 
interest rates phases.
15
 The differences between the Divisia M3 and the simple sum M3 are even 
more striking during these phases. Generally, at the beginning of high interest rate phases the 
idiosyncratic term for Divisia M3 starts to fall, and reaches its lowest values towards the end of 
these phases. At the trough, the idiosyncratic term for Divisia M3 starts to increase.
16
 This 
pattern is not observed in the idiosyncratic term for simple sum M3. That is, the dynamics of 
these Divisia indexes correspond more closely to the expected movements related to interest 
rates and inflation. Recall that the idiosyncratic terms show when the two series differ – that is, 
what they do not have in common.  
 In a speech at the Fourth ECB Central Banking Conference, Chairman Bernanke (2006) 
discussed some potential problems of the use of simple sum monetary aggregates for monetary 
policy. In particular, he mentions that between 1991 and 1992 simple sum M2 grew much more 
                                                          
15 Barnett, Chauvet and Tierney (2009) classify a high interest rate phase as one in which the Federal Funds rate increases 
persistently for two quarters, and lasts until it reaches a peak. Analogously, low interest rate phases start when the Fed Funds rate 
falls for two quarters, and lasts until it reaches a trough. 
16 Note, however, that this relationship is not one-to-one. For general utility functions, the direction of the change in shares with 
a price change, or equivalently with an interest rate change, depends upon whether the own price elasticity of demand exceeds or 
is less than -1.  This is the case, for example, in the early and late 1960s. 
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slowly than was predicted by models used by the Federal Reserve Board. In particular, the so-
called P* model, which used simple sum M2 in the quantity theory of money and estimates of 
long-run potential output and velocity to predict long-run inflation trends even predicted 
deflation for these years.  Figure 24 shows the differences between Divisia M2 and simple sum 
M2. The rate of growth of Divisia M2 was substantially higher than the rate of growth of simple 
sum M2 during this period.  
  
11. The 2008 Financial Crisis  
 11.1. Prior to July 2004 
 We believe that the highly-leveraged investment, borrowing, and lending that led up to the current 
crisis were not “irrational” relative to the views that had widely arisen about the Great Moderation and the 
Greenspan Put.  The problem was the information set which the expectations were conditioned.  There is 
evidence that the monetary policy in recent decades may have been more expansionary than was realized 
by the Federal Reserve and thereby may have fed the bubbles.  There is also evidence that policy may 
have been more contractionary than realized by the Federal Reserve at the start of the crisis.  We wish to 
emphasize that the evidence is not unambiguous in these regards, largely as a result of unfortunate 
Federal Reserve data limitations.  In addition to the problems emphasized in this paper, there also is the 
fact that the Federal Reserve reports demand deposits post-sweeps, thereby biasing downwards both M1, 
M2, and M3, with the bias in M1 being especially severe. However, since sweeps are excluded from both 
simple sum and Divisia aggregates, the difference between these two indices are not affected by this 
problem.
17
  In any case, we feel that it is worthwhile providing the evidence that we have. 
 There is a strain of thought that maintains that the current U.S. financial crisis was prompted by 
excessive money creation fueling the bubbles.  The process started in early 2001, when money supply 
growth was increased substantially to minimize the economic recession that had started in March of that 
year. However, in contrast with previous recessions, money supply growth continued to be high for a few 
                                                          
17 In order to evade reserve requirements, banks sweep demand deposits into money-market deposit savings accounts, but 
continue to service them as regular demand deposits. Thus, the method of aggregation is not the only problem.  See, e.g., Jones, 
Dutkowsky, and Elger (2005).   
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years after the recession‟s end in November 2001. In fact, money supply growth was high until mid 2004, 
after which it started decreasing slowly. The argument is that the monetary expansion during this first 
period led to both speculation and leveraging, especially regarding lending practices in the housing sector.  
This expansion is argued as having made it possible for marginal borrowers to obtain loans with lower 
collateral values.  When money creation slowed, housing prices began to decline, leading many to own 
negative equity and inducing a wave of defaults and foreclosures.   
 If this were the case, it would be worthwhile to ask what would have motivated the policy that had 
this outcome.  We see no reason to believe that the Federal Reserve would have as a goal to create 
„excessive‟ money growth.  Had they known that the amount of money circulating in the economy was 
excessive and could generate an asset bubble, monetary policy would have been reverted long before it 
did.  
 Figures 25a and 25b display the idiosyncratic term for simple sum M3 and Divisia M3, as well as 
the difference between the two monetary aggregates for the recent period, plotted against the NBER-dated 
recession and high interest rate phases, respectively.  First, notice that, as in the case of the previous 
recessions, the idiosyncratic term for Divisia M3 before the 2001 recession falls substantially more than 
the idiosyncratic term for simple sum M3. This is also observed in the difference between the rate of 
growth of the two indices.  As shown in the figure, the subsequent increase in money supply growth 
during the 2001 recession, as measured by Divisia M3, was substantially larger than as measured by 
simple sum M3.  In addition, Divisia money supply growth continued to be much higher than simple sum 
money supply between 2001 and 2003. Thus, the actual money supply growth post-recession was even 
higher than what was intended. These differences between the two indexes confounded monetary policy 
by underestimating the real amount of money available in the economy, as measured by the Divisia index.  
 
 11.2. Subsequent to July 2004. 
 There may be some truth to the view that the recent bubble economy was accommodated by years 
of excessively expansionary monetary policy.  Since all bubbles eventually burst, it is thereby argued that 
the current problems were unavoidable.  Whether or not that view is correct, it is interesting to ask what 
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broke the bubble, even if it eventually would have burst anyway.  Comparison of the Divisia and simple 
sum monetary aggregates and inspection of Federal Reserve data provide relevant information.   
 The Federal Reserve had been increasing the target value for the federal funds rate since June 2004. 
As can be seen in Figure 25b, this corresponded to a decrease in the idiosyncratic terms for M3 and 
Divisia M3. However, Divisia M3 fell substantially more than the simple sum M3. The difference 
between the two indices increases substantially until the end of the sample in 2005:4.
18
 Thus, the official 
simple sum M3 masks, once again, a much more contractionary policy by the Federal Reserve than 
intended, as also occurred prior to most recessions in the last 50 years. 
 By conventional measures, the Federal Reserve has been easing its monetary policy stance by 
reducing its target value for the federal funds interest rate from 5.25 percent in September 2007 to its 
recent level of near zero percent in 2008 and 2009.  Has the Fed thereby been engaging in actions that are 
stimulative to economic activity?  Low interest rates do not necessarily an expansionary monetary policy 
make. 
 It is helpful to illustrate the problem with a different central bank activity:  sterilized exchange rate 
intervention.  When the Fed decides to intervene in foreign exchange markets, its foreign desk swaps 
dollar-denominated assets for assets denominated in a foreign currency.  Left unchecked at this point, the 
reserves of the U.S. banking system (and the U.S. money supply) would change, as would the market 
value of the federal funds interest rate.  To sterilize the foreign exchange transaction, the domestic desk of 
the Fed, in a subsequent operation, either buys or sells U.S. Treasuries in a magnitude sufficient to offset 
the impact of the foreign desk‟s activity and thereby keeps the U.S. money supply, the federal funds rate, 
and the reserves of the U.S. banking system unchanged.  On net, two things are accomplished by these 
offsetting transactions by the Fed‟s foreign and domestic desks:  creating the symbolic gesture of “doing 
something” about the dollar‟s value and exposing the U.S. taxpayer to potential losses, if subsequent 
changes in the exchange rate cause losses in the market value of the foreign assets now on the Fed‟s 
books. 
                                                          
18 We have no way of knowing the pattern of the broader aggregates, M3 and L, from 2006 on, since collection of both has been 
terminated by the Federal Reserve. 
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 Similarly, much recent Federal Reserve activity, including its role in bailouts, has been sterilized 
and has had little effect on bank reserves, while exposing the taxpayers to sub-standard asset risk.  To 
illustrate the point, the Federal Reserve Figure 26 shows the total amount of reserves in the U.S. banking 
system over the past five years.  Note that reserves – the raw material from which loans and spending are 
created – are lower in mid-2008 than in August of 2003!  But changes in the funds rate are usually 
interpreted in the media as the product of Fed policy actions.  According to that view, if the funds rate 
declines, it must be the result of an expansionary monetary policy action.  Missing from this analysis is 
the other side of the reserves market:  those who demand reserves have some ability to affect the price – 
i.e., the federal funds rate – at which reserves trade.  Those demanders are banks that see the demand for 
reserves rise and fall along with the demand for loans.  When the demand for loans falls, the demand for 
reserves by banks declines.  Hence, the federal funds rate can decline, because of declines in the demands 
for loans and reserves, without the Fed taking any policy action.  While a decline in the funds rate is 
usually interpreted as “evidence” of an easy policy stance, the real signal in the market may be that the 
economy is weakening.   
 The Great Depression and the recent history of Japan‟s long stagnation reveal that low interest 
rates, per se, are ambiguous indicators of the relative ease of monetary policy.  The missing ingredient is 
the flow of bank reserves, the ultimate source of credit from which all other lending ultimately grows.  
For better or for worse, intentional or unintentional, herein may be the pin that pricked the recent bubble. 
 Subsequent to the Fed‟s publication of the discouraging Figure 26 chart below, there has been an 
enormous surge of reserves injected into the banking system through the Fed‟s lender-of-last-resort 
function at its discount window; through the new credit facilities, such as the Primary Dealer Credit 
Facility and Term Auction Facility; and through the long overdue initiation of the Fed‟s payment of 
interest on reserves – an important new reform that provides an incentive for banks to increase their 
holdings of reserves.  See Figure 27.  
 
12. The Most Recent Data 
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 Considering these most recent results along with the many others provided in this paper, and the 
relevant microeconomic aggregation theory, you might find it to be worthwhile to compare the most 
recent behavior of the Taylor rule, which does not use money at all.  Figure 28 is reproduced from the St. 
Louis Federal Reserve Bank‟s publication, Monetary Trends.  That figure displays the range of the target 
for the federal funds rate produced from the Taylor rule along with the actual interest rate over that time 
period, where the actual funds rate is the dark solid line.  Notice that the actual interest rate was off target 
for more than three successive years.  Perhaps we now have a new paradox:  the appearance of instability 
of the Taylor rule. 
 As documented in this paper, monetary policy and monetary research have been plagued by bad 
monetary aggregates data, resulting from simple sum aggregation, which has been disreputable in 
aggregation and index number theorist for over a half century.  In addition, we have shown that the 
puzzles that have arisen since the early 1970s were produced by simple sum aggregation and would be 
resolved, if reputable index number formulas were used.  With so much history and evidence and so much 
research documenting the data problems, it might be assumed that central banks would now be taking 
much care to provide high quality data that is consistent with economic theory. 
 But look at Figure 29, which was downloaded from the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank web site 
and is produced from official Federal Reserve Board data.  Recall that during Volcker‟s “Monetarist 
Experiment” period, the instrument of policy was nonborrowed reserves.  Figure 29, displays official 
recent data on nonborrowed reserves from the Federal Reserve Board. 
 Total reserves are the sum of borrowed reserves and nonborrowed reserves.  Nonborrowed reserves 
are those reserves that were not borrowed, while borrowed reserves are those reserves that were 
borrowed.  Clearly everything included in borrowed reserves must be reserves, and everything contained 
in nonborrowed reserves must be reserves.  Hence it is impossible for either borrowed reserves or 
nonborrowed reserves to exceed total reserves.  A negative value for either borrowed reserves or 
nonborrowed reserves would be an oxymoron.   
 Observe that nonborrowed reserves recently have crashed to about minus 50 billion dollars.  The 
Federal Reserve‟s explanation is that they are including the new auction borrowing from the Federal 
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Reserve in nonborrowed reserves, even though the new auction facility borrowing need not be held as 
reserves.  Hence according to this “data,” the instrument of monetary policy during Volcker‟s Monetarist 
Experiment period now has been driven to a very negative value, which contradicts the definition of 
“nonborrowed reserves.”19 
 Since the Bank of England is the only central bank in the world that publishes Divisia money 
officially, it is especially interesting to look at UK data.
20
  As the current recession developed, the Bank of 
England adopted a policy of “quantity easing” focusing on expanding the supply of monetary services, 
rather than interest rates, which already were at very low levels.  Following that change in policy, there 
was little evidence of positive consequences.  While this puzzled many who were following the Bank of 
England‟s simple sum monetary aggregates, Figure 30 displays both simple sum M4 and Divisia M4, 
both from the official Bank of England source.  Clearly Divisia M4 reflects a tightening of policy, rather 
than the intended loosening, implied by simple sum M4.  For further details of this phenomenon, see 
Rayton and Pavlyk (2010). 
 
13. Conclusion 
 We have shown that most of the puzzles and paradoxes that have evolved in the monetary 
economics literature were produced by the simple-sum monetary aggregates, provided officially by most 
central banks, and are resolved by use of aggregation-theoretic monetary aggregates.  We argue that 
official central-bank data throughout the world have not significantly improved, despite the existence of 
better data internal to some of those central banks for their own use.  We document the fact that the 
profession, financial firms, borrowers, lenders, and central banks have repeatedly been misled by 
defective central-bank monetary data over the past half century.  
 Many commonly held views need to be rethought, since many such views were based upon 
                                                          
19 See Barnett (2009). 
20 The US and ECB Divisia data are not supplied in a formally official manner.  The St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank 
computes and supplies Divisia monetary aggregate data for the US, but the Federal Reserve Board in Washington, 
DC does not.  The European Central Bank’s (ECB) Governing Council is provided quarterly projections on economic 
and financial variables by the ECB’s staff, along with information based upon the Divisia monetary aggregates in 
accordance with Barnett (2007).  Since that ECB staff information is used to inform the Council on a confidential basis, 
the data are not provided to the public. 
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atheoretical data.  For example, the views on the Great Moderation need to be reconsidered, at least 
relative to the current crisis and the role of monetary policy.  We find no reason to believe that the 
moderation in the business cycle during the past two decades had any appreciable connection with 
improved monetary policy, and in fact we find no reason to believe that there have been significant 
improvements in monetary policy over that time period.  In particular, we believe that the increased risk-
taking that produced the recent financial crisis resulted from a misperception of cyclical systemic risk.  
The misperception was caused by rational expectations conditioned upon a faulty information set.   
 We do not take a position on what produced the Great Moderation, only on what did not.  We are 
not comfortable with the widespread view that the source of the crisis is the irrational “greed” of the 
victims of the misperceptions, and we are not aware of a definition of the word “greed” in the field of 
economics.  We similarly do not believe that the policy of the Federal Reserve was intentionally too 
expansionary during the evolution of the bubbles that preceded the current crisis or intentionally 
excessively contractionary as the bubbles burst.  But we do find evidence supporting the view that the 
misperceptions and poor decisions in the private and public sectors of the economy were connected with 
defective data that are inconsistent with modern aggregation and index number theory and could have 
produced unrealistically excessive confidence in the capabilities of the Federal Reserve, as in Wall 
Street‟s confidence in “The Greenspan Put.”21  In addition, we show that the misperceptions were 
connected with excessive liquidity that fed the bubble, and the crisis was connected with a more 
contractionary policy than intended.  The recent economic consequences can be understood in that 
context.  
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Table 1:  Mean Growth Rates During the Period November 1979 to August 1982 
Monetary Aggregate  Mean Growth Rate 
 
Divisia M2  4.5  
Simple Sum M2  9.3  
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Divisia M3  4.8  
Simple Sum M3  10.0 
 
Figure 1:  Demand Side Aggregation Error Range 
 
 
Figure 2:  Seasonally adjusted normalized velocity during the 1970s 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3:  Interest Rates during the 1970s:  10 year government bond rate 
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Figure 4:  Simple Sum M3 Velocity versus Interest Rate:  Moody‟s AAA corporate bond rate, 
quarterly,1959.1-19980.3 
 
  Figure 5:  Divisia M3 Velocity versus Interest Rate:  Moody‟s AAA corporate bond rate, 
quarterly, 1959.1-19980.3 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6:  Simple Sum M3 Base Multiplier versus Interest Rate:  deviation from time trend of Moody‟s Baa 
corporate bond rate, monthly 1969.1-1981.8.  
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Figure 7:  Divisia M3 Monetary Aggregate Base Multiplier versus Deviation from time trend of Moody‟s Baa 
corporate bond Interest Rate, monthly 1969.1-1981-8.  
 
Figure 8:  Income Coefficient Time Path 
 
 
Figure 9:  Market Interest Rate (commercial paper rate) Coefficient Time Path 
- 47 - 
 
 
Figure 10:  Regulated Interest Rate (passbook rate) Coefficient Time Path 
 
 
Figure 11:  Seasonally adjusted annual M3 Growth Rates. Divisia (
___
), simple sum (---). The last three 
observations to the right of the vertical line are post sample period.  
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Figure 12:  Monetary Growth Rates, 1970-1996, from St. Louis Federal Reserve‟s Database 
 
Figure 13.  Simulated velocity slope coefficient with stochastic volatility of interest rates
 
 
 
Figure 14:  M2 Joint Product and Economic Capital Stock of Money.  M2=simple sum joint product;  
CEM2=economic capital stock part of the joint product.  
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Figure 15:  M2+ Joint Product and Economic Capital Stock of Money.  M2+=simple sum joint product;  
CEM2+=economic capital stock part of the joint product.  
 
Figure 16:  Monetary Base Surge 
 
 
Figure 17:  Y2K Computer Bug 
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Figure 18:  Financial General Equilibrium without Required Reserves 
 
 
Figure 19:  Financial Equilibrium with Positive Required Reserves 
 
 
Figure 20:  Squared Coherence between Divisia Demand and Supply Side Divisia 
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Figure 21:  Simple sum M3, Divisia demand DDM3, and Divisia supply SDM3 
 
Figure 22:  Idiosyncratic terms for M3 growth (---), Divisia M3 growth (
__
), difference between Divisia M3 
growth and Simple Sum M3 growth (
_ _
), and NBER Recessions (shaded area)  
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Figure 23: Idiosyncratic terms for M3 growth (---), Divisia M3 growth (
__
), difference between Divisia M3 
growth and Simple Sum M3 growth (
_ _
), and High Interest Rate Phases (shaded area)  
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Figure 24:  Idiosyncratic terms for M2 growth (---), Divisia M2 growth (
__
), difference between Divisia M2 
growth and Simple Sum M2 growth (
_ _
), and NBER Recession (shaded area)  
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Figure 25:  Idiosyncratic terms for M3 growth (---), Divisia M3 growth (
__
), difference between Divisia M3 
growth and Simple Sum M3 growth (
_ _
) 
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Figure 26:  Total Reserves Until Very Recently 
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Figure 27:  Total Reserves Including Recent Surge 
 
 
 
Figure 28:  Taylor Rule Federal Funds Rate 
 
 
Figure 29:  Nonborrowed Reserves 
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Figure 30:  Growth in M4 Simple Sum (---) and M4 Divisia Aggregate (___) for the UK 
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